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COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
The cases examined in this survey article involve various facets of
the Tenth Circuit's decisions in the area of commercial law. The most
significant case handed down in this area was one in which the court
mounted an attack against the Federal Reserve Board's attempt to im-
permissibly aggrandize its jurisdiction through an expanded definition
of a "bank."
Another significant commercial law decision held that standby let-
ters of credit, representing primary obligations of the issuing bank, fall
within the Federal Deposit Insurance Act's definition of a "deposit" and
thus constitute insured deposits. During the past survey period, the
Tenth Circuit's emphasis also became more pronounced in focusing on
the substance rather than the form of commercial transactions. Its re-
fusal to exalt form over substance was illustrated not only in a case in-
volving a commercial lending transaction, but also in a consumer credit
transaction. Additionally, the court announced an expanded "likelihood
of confusion" test in a trademark infringement case. Finally, this article
includes a synoptic survey of opinions handed down in the area of bank-
ruptcy law.
I. NONBANK BANKS: DIMENSION FINANCIAL CORP.
V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
In Dimension Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors,' the Tenth Circuit
prohibited the Federal Reserve Board (Board) from improperly altering
its definition of "demand deposit" and "commercial loan" as a vehicle
for expanding the parameters of its jurisdiction. These definitional
changes were made in Regulation y,2 promulgated under the Bank
Holding Company Act (Act).3 The Board's expanded definitional and
jurisdictional regulation would have included limited-service financial
institutions, known as nonbank banks, within the Act's definition of a
"bank," thereby allowing the Board to regulate such institutions' expan-
sion and growth.
i. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984). cert. granted. 105 S. Ct. 2137-38 (1985) [Editors
Note: Subsequent to the submission of this survey article, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit decision in Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial
Corp., 106 S. Ct. 6$1 (1986).].
2. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1985).
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982). The Act constitutes a comprehensive federal frame-
work for the supervision and regulation of bank holding companies. A "bank holding
company" is a company which controls a "bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(2)(1) (1982). The Act
vests broad regulatory authority in the Board over such companies "'to restrain the undue
concentration of commercial banking resources and to prevent possible abuses related to
the control of commercial credit." S. REP. No. 1084 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5519, 5541.
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A. Background
The scope of the Board's regulatory power is limited by the Act's
definition of the word "bank." This definition has been narrowed by
several statutory changes since the Act's inception.4 Since 1970, how-
ever, the Act has defined a "bank" as any institution that: "(1) accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial loans." 5 Since this
narrowed definition requires the presence of both the demand deposit
and commercial loan elements, many nonbank banks6 fall outside the
Act's jurisdiction and the Board's control. In an attempt to bring these
nonbank banks within its purview, the Board redefined both compo-
nents of the Act's definition of a "bank" by amending Regulation y.
7
The revised regulation broadened the definition of "demand deposit"
to include deposits, like NOW accounts, which "as a matter of practice"
are payable on demand. 8 Additionally, Regulation Y expanded the defi-
nition of "commercial loan" to include such items as money market and
interbank transactions. 9
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In Dimension, the revised Regulation Y was challenged through a pe-
tition for review of the Board's changes. The Tenth Circuit, Chief
Judge Seth writing, set aside both the demand deposit and the commer-
cial loan elements of the Board's amended regulation.' 0 The court did
4. The original 1956 Act simply defined a bank as "any national banking association
or any state bank, savings bank, or trust company." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1964) (amended
1966). Congress amended that statutory definition in 1966, and a "bank" was then de-
fined as an institution that accepted deposits which "the depositor has a legal right to
withdraw on demand." See S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2385, 2391. In 1970, the Act was further amended to exclude all
institutions which did not "engage in the business of making commercial loans." 12
U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
6. The term "nonbank banks" generally refers to an entity that is considered a bank
under some criteria but does not satisfy both elements of the Act's definition. Nonbank
banks fall under the regulatory power of the Comptroller of the Currency, not the Federal
Reserve Board. See C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 83-84
(1983). See generally Lobell, Nonbank Banks: Controversy Over a New Form of Consumer Bank, 39
Bus. LAw. 1193 (1984) (discussing nonbank banks and their relationship to the Bank
Holding Company Act); Note, The Demise Of The Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument For
Deregulating The Activities Of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650 (1985) (discuss-
ing the regulation of bank holding companies and how nonbank banks avoid these
regulations).
7. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.2(a)(l)(A), (B) (1985). The Federal Reserve Board amended
Regulation Y under section 2(c) of the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). See generally Loe-
ser, Bank Hotding Company Regulation: The Federal Reserve Board's Recent Revision Of Regulation
1, 101 BANKING L.J. 525, 542-44 (1984) (discusses the changes to the definition of "de-
mand deposit" and "commercial loan").
8. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(l)(A) (1985).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(l)(B) (1985). A commercial loan is "any loan other than a
loan to an individual for personal, family, household, or charitable purposes" including
"the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of deposit, bank-
ers' acceptances, and similar money market instruments." Id.
10. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1411.
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not discuss the changed demand deposit definition, however, as it had
already been considered in an earlier Tenth Circuit opinion.II Thus,
the court focused solely on the Board's new and changed view of what
constitutes a "commercial loan" under the Act, and in particular, the
inclusion of money market and interbank transactions under the Board's
new definition.
In concluding that the Board's new definition of "commercial loan"
was not consistent with the purpose of the Act, the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed the following considerations: (1) the term's general meaning as
used in business and in regulatory agencies, including the Board's us-
age; (2) the Board's purpose for the definitional changes; (3) the legisla-
tive history of the Act; and (4) the Board's authority under the Act to
promulgate rules and regulations.'
2
In examining the general meaning of the term "commercial loan,"
the court concluded that the new definition was adopted without refer-
ence to the actual meaning of the term. It first noted that the Board's
changed definition was a departure from the term's prevailing usage em-
ployed by businesses, by Congress, and by other regulatory agencies. 13
Furthermore, the court found that the common understanding of the
term reflected the Board's own definition before 1982.14 Only after
1982 did the Board begin to alter its position that money market and
interbank transactions qualified as commercial loans.15
Next, the Tenth Circuit examined the Board's purpose for effectuat-
ing the changes. It determined that the Board altered the "commercial
loan" definition solely to implement a new Board policy; to halt the fast-
paced changes occurring in businesses providing financial services. 16
The Board considered it necessary to bring nonbank banks under its
11. See First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984). In
First Bancorporation, the court stated that the statutory definition of demand deposit was a
deposit giving the depositor "a legal right to withdraw on demand." Id. at 436 (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 1841(c) (emphasis added)). The court disagreed with the Board's determination
in that case that NOW accounts are demand deposits within the meaning of the Act. The
court stated that since the lending institution reserves the legal right to demand prior
notice of withdrawal, it is not a bank under the Act. First Bancorporation, 728 F.2d at 436.
See also Note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Administrative Law, 62 DEN. U.L.
REV. 17-18 (1985) (discussing changed definition of "demand deposit").
12. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1404-11.
13. Id. at 1404-06. The Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC both took posi-
tions contrary to the Board. Id. at 1410.
14. Id. at 1405-06. In 1972, 1976, and 1981 the Board rendered opinions or gave
advice that money market funds, certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, broker call
loans, and commercial paper were not commercial loans. Id. at 1405.
15. The consistent position of the Board abruptly halted in December of 1982, when
it announced that the Dreyfus Corporation's proposed purchase of a state bank would be
considered a purchase of a "bank" under the Act because the Act's term "commercial
loans" included the purchase of "commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and certificates
of deposit, the extension of broker call loans, the sale of federal funds, the deposit of
interest bearing funds and similar lending vehicles." Id. at 1406. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) disagreed with the Board's change of position and permit-
ted the acquisition of the bank. Id.
16. Id. at 1405-06.
1986]
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jurisdiction to accomplish this goal. 17 The court was severe in its criti-
cism of the Board's actions, 18 finding that the redefinition and expan-
sion of jurisdiction would cause extensive and disruptive changes in
other agencies and in businesses providing financial services to the pub-
lic.19 In short, a pervasive restructuring of this country's financial sys-
tem would occur.
The court also analyzed the Act's legislative history, which revealed
that Congress intended to exclude from Board regulation those institu-
tions whose only commercial credit activity is the purchase of money
market or interbank transactions. 20 Finally, the court examined the
Board's authority under the Act to make regulations 2 1 and held that the
Act constricts the subject matter of the Board's functions basically
within the confines of "anticompetitive considerations." ' 22 The court
recognized the narrow scope of the statute and its clearly specified pur-
pose and analyzed the Board's concomitant operation within these limi-
tations. It held that such proposed action requires a congressional
change in the agency's jurisdiction, and the Board could not sua sponte
exercise powers not provided for or denied by Congress. 23 Thus, the
Board's power is narrowly confined within the limits set by Congress.
Regardless of the perceived need for change, such changes are for Con-
gress and not for the Board to implement.
C. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit was justified in prohibiting the Board from
broadening its sphere of influence through the expansion of a defini-
tion. This decision's impact reaches far beyond the setback to the Board
in curtailing nonbank banks' commercial activities. In demanding that
17. The Board's departure from the accepted meaning of a commercial loan was to
provide, via an expansion ofjurisdiction, a "regulatory device to change the course of the
development of financial institutions which had taken place in conformance with the Act as
construed by the Board from the outset." Id. at 1407.
18. "In short, the new definition has nothing to do with the original meaning of the
term. . . but instead was a device to accomplish an end-a change in the Board's jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 1405.
19. The court viewed the proposed changes as causing
divestitures of old acquisitions, sale of assets, [and] changes in permitted uses of
excess funds by state chartered and other institutions. It [would] also . . . have a
drastic impact on many other types of business arrangements and on the way
business [is] conducted, [and] who could insure deposits and changes in regula-
tory authority from states to the "fed."
Id. at 1406.
20. Id. at 1408.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982) authorizes the Board "to issue such regulations and
orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this
chapter and to prevent evasions thereof."
22. See, e.g., Western Bancshares, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 480 F.2d 749, 753-54
(10th Cir. 1973) (The 1970 amendments were designed to protect against noncompetitive
practices; no "public good" provisions were included.).
23. Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1409. See also Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors, 517
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975) (FDIC not empowered to alter the definition of "subsidiary," the
scope of which Congress carefully considered); Garvey v. Freeman, 397 F.2d 600 (10th
Cir. 1968) (power of agencies to carry on government activities is circumscribed by the
authority granted) (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944)).
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agencies not broadly interpret their mandate from Congress, this deci-
sion will remind the agencies to remain within the confines of their
rulemaking authority. This decision also illustrates the Tenth Circuit's
refusal to renounce its responsibilities by chanting an indiscriminate lit-
any of deference to agency expertise. The Federal Reserve Board's at-
tempted four-fold division of this country's tripartite political structure
was thus effectively arrested as was the peril to this nation's financial
structure.
II. STANDBY LETrERS OF CREDIT: PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORP. v. FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP.
In Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,24 the
Tenth Circuit addressed another federal agency attempt to alter a defini-
tion in a statute it was delegated to administer. In this case, however,
the agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), at-
tempted to refine a definition to exclude certain transactions, whereas in
Dimension, the Federal Reserve Board attempted to broaden a definition
to include certain entities.
A. The Facts
This case arose out of the 1982 failure of the Penn Square Bank in
Oklahoma City. The plaintiff, Philadelphia Gear, was a trade supplier
that furnished equipment to Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion),
a Penn Square customer. Upon Orion's application, Penn Square issued
an irrevocable standby letter of credit for the benefit of Philadelphia
Gear in April of 1981.25 The letter of credit provided that drafts drawn
upon it must be accompanied by certain requisite documents.
26
On July 5, 1982, the Comptroller of the Currency declared Penn
Square insolvent and appointed the FDIC as receiver. 27 Two days
later-seventeen days after the insolvency-Philadelphia Gear
presented to the receiver drafts for payment on the letter of credit total-
ing $724,728.50. Philadelphia Gear then received a formal notice from
Penn Square's liquidator stating that the receiver disaffirmed any and all
obligations under the letter of credit and also stating that it would not
honor any drafts thereon. The liquidator then returned the unpaid
24. 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. granted. 106 S. Ct. 245 (1985).
25. Id. at 1133. The letter of credit was issued on April 23, 1981, for $145,200 and
expired August 1, 1982. That same day, Orion executed an unsecured note for $145,200
in favor of Penn Square as security for the letter of credit.
26. Id. The letter of credit required that drafts drawn upon it must be accompanied
by Philadelphia Gear's signed statement showing that they had invoiced Orion and that
the invoices remained unpaid for at least 15 days. Copies of all invoices were also re-
quired. These invoices were to be verified for authenticity with Orion before payment. A
few days later, the letter of credit was amended by deleting the statement about verifying
invoices and the following language was added: "This credit shall be automatically rein-
stated from time to time for any sum or sums up to $145,000 upon presentation of de-
scribed documents. This credit and all reinstatements are irrevocable and shall expire on
August 1, 1982." Id.
27. Id.
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drafts.28
Philadelphia Gear, as beneficiary, sought to enforce the standby let-
ter of credit by suing the FDIC in its corporate capacity as insurer for
$100,000 in deposit insurance proceeds. The company also sued the
FDIC in its official capacity as receiver for Penn Square for the letter of
credit's total uninsured outstanding balance of $624,728.50.29 The
Oklahoma federal district court rendered judgment in favor of Philadel-
phia Gear on all of the issues dealing with deposit insurance, and in
favor of the FDIC in its capacity as receiver on the question of the total
value of the letter of credit.
30
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The FDIC presented three legal issues in its appeal to the Tenth
Circuit.3 ' The first issue considered by the court was whether the
standby letter of credit issued by Penn Square represented a "deposit"
within section 1813(t)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and was
thus a deposit insured by the FDIC. 3 2 The FDIC argued that the letter
of credit failed to meet two elements of the statutory definition: (1) it
was not issued in exchange for "money or its equivalent," and (2) it was
not a letter upon which the bank is "primarily liable." The agency con-
tended that the "money or its equivalent" element of the definition was
unsatisfied because no advance was made on Orion's promissory note.
Since Philadelphia Gear did not present the requisite documents enu-
merated in the letter of credit before Penn Square's insolvency, the
FDIC argued that Orion's note was nonnegotiable because it repre-
sented only a contingent obligation.
3 3
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the negotia-
bility of an instrument must be determined from the face of the instru-
ment3 4 and that the negotiability of Orion's note was not predicated on
the presentation of documents under the letter of credit.3 5 Thus the
court affirmed the district court's holding that the transfer qualified as
28. Id. at 1134.
29. Id. at 1133.
30. Id.
31. A fourth issue was presented in this case. As cross-appellant, Philadelphia Gear
claimed that the district court erred in construing the amount of the letter of credit as the
aggregate sum of $145,200 rather than the $724,628.50. The Tenth Circuit found that the
district court properly determined the total value of the letter of credit by construing an
ambiguous clause against its drafter, Philadelphia Gear. Id. at 1139-50. Further discus-
sion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(/)(1) (1982) defines a deposit as:
[T]he unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank in the
usual course of business and. . . which is evidenced by. . . a letter of credit...
on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, that, without limiting the general-
ity of the term "money or its equivalent," any such account or instrument must be
regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited or
issued in exchange for. . . a promissory note upon which the person obtaining
any such credit or instrument is primarily or secondarily liable . ...
33. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d at 1134. See U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(B) (1978).
34. 751 F.2d at 1134. See U.C.C. § 3-105(2)(a) (1978).
35. 751 F.2d at 1134. See U.C.C. § 3-105(l)(d) (1978).
[Vol. 63:2
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one in which "money or its equivalent" was issued in exchange for the
promissory note. Since Penn Square had agreed to make funds available
for the benefit of Orion, and in return Orion had executed a promissory
note obligating it to repay advances made by the bank, the court found
that a commercial transaction had occurred.
3 6
The FDIC also argued that a second element of section 1813(/)(1)'s
definition was not met since the letter of credit in issue was not one on
which the bank was "primarily liable." The agency maintained that the
section's language referring to letters of credit on which the bank is pri-
marily liable was intended to refer to commercial letters and not to
standby letters of credit such as the one issued by Penn Square.
3 7
In support of this position, the FDIC contended that a standby let-
ter of credit is essentially a guaranty of the account party's performance
because the issuing bank's obligation is triggered only in the event that
the account party defaults on the underlying contract. 38 The agency ar-
gued that such letters were not within the ambit of a national bank's
authority to act as a guarantor of another party's debts.
39
The Tenth Circuit rejected this contention and refused to defer to
the FDIC's interpretation. 40 The court noted that the agency's position
was inconsistent with federal regulations promulgated by the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency4 1 and with the prior position taken by the FDIC.
4 2
The court compared standby letters of credit with a surety's contract
guaranteeing a principal's debt,4 3 but differentiated the two on the
grounds that a bank issuing a standby letter of credit assumes signifi-
36. 751 F.2d at 1134.
37. Id. at 1135. Generally, the key document presented under a letter of credit is a
certificate of default by the customer on the underlying obligation. For a discussion of the
similarities and differences between a commercial and a standby letter of credit, see B.
CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS, § 8.2, at 8-5 (rev.
ed. 1981). This argument was based on the assertion that the agency assisted in drafting a
significant portion of the statute in question and is charged with administering its
provisions.
38. 751 F.2d at 1136.
39. Id. See First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.) (rec-
ognizing the rule that national banks are not authorized to enter into guarantees), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978); 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
40. The FDIC asserted that deference is often given to an agency's interpretation of a
statute it administers, especially if Congress has expressly delegated authority to an agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute. Since the court found no evidence that
Congress explicitly delegated authority to the FDIC to refine the definition of deposit and
since the agency had not acted as if it possessed such authority, the court refused to give
the FDIC interpretation substantial deference. Instead, the court examined three factors
in giving weight to the agency's interpretation of section 1813(0(1): the agency's thor-
oughness, the validity of its reasoning, and consistency with its other pronouncements.
751 F.2d at 1135.
41. Id. at 1136 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1985)). 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 states that
-[a] national bank may issue letters of credit permissible under the Uniform Commercial
Code or the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits to or on behalf of its
customers. The Uniform Commercial Code contemplates that banks may issue standby
letters of credit."
42. See, e.g., FDIC v. Freudenfeld, 492 F. Supp. 763, 767 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (A standby
letter of credit is not a guaranty according to the FDIC.).
43. 751 F.2d at 1136.
19861
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cantly less conditional liability than does a surety. Unlike an ordinary
guarantor who in many instances will be able to assert "real defenses,
' 4 4
the liability of a bank issuing a standby letter of credit is nearly abso-
lute;4 5 it must pay claims against the letter even if the account party has
legal defenses for nonpayment. Thus, the court held, as it has previ-
ously done under different facts, 4 6 that standby letters of credit repre-
sent primary and not secondary obligations of the issuing bank.
The FDIC also contended that the federal deposit insurance fund is
structured to exclude standby letters of credit from the scope of section
1813 (1)(1)'s definition of deposit. It reasoned that Congress had estab-
lished specific guidelines to be applied in determining the proper assess-
ment amount each member bank should contribute to the insurance
fund, which amount was predicated on the amount absolutely due upon
a bank's failure.4 7 Since an issuing bank's liability under a standby letter
of credit relies upon the account party's default on its contract with the
letter's beneficiary, such liabilities are contingent. It was never Con-
gress' intention that "the FDIC attempt to evaluate and assess the risks
associated with such contingent liabilities."
'48
This contention was curtly dismissed by the Tenth Circuit. It found
no language in either the statute or its legislative history that would limit
the definition of a deposit to exclude standby letters of credit. 49 The
court held that these instruments were thus within the statutory defini-
tion of a "deposit," and that letters of credit constitute insured deposits.
The second issue considered by the court was whether Philadelphia
Gear, as beneficiary of a standby letter of credit, was the insured deposi-
tor entitled to recover the deposit insurance proceeds. Since records of
the insolvent bank are conclusive as to a claimant's entitlement to de-
posit insurance, 50 the FDIC argued that the drafts presented two days
and seventeen days after Penn Square's insolvency were unrecorded
contingent liabilities at the time of insolvency.
5 1
In deciding that Philadelphia Gear was the insured depositor, the
44. Id. See U.C.C. § 3-415, comment 1 (1978).
45. Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d 1136; see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-2 ( 2d ed. 1980). Compare U.C.C.
§ 3-415 (1978) (simple contract defenses are afforded an ordinary guarantor) with U.C.C.
§ 5-114 (1978) (issuance of a letter of credit has obligations not exclusively contractual in
nature to beneficiary).
46. See Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mutual Life Insurance Co., 465 F.2d 211, 213 (10th
Cir. 1972) (bank primarily liable on letter of credit issued to assure compliance with condi-
tions of a loan commitment); see also Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
707 F.2d 680, 682 (2d Cir. 1983) (bank's obligation to the beneficiary is primary, direct
and independent of any claims arising in the underlying sale transaction).
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1982).
48. 751 F.2d at 1137.
49. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) for the definition of "deposit," and 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(a)(1) which includes within the definition of a deposit, "a letter of credit . . . on
which the bank is primarily liable.")). See generally 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3765-3779.
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 1822(c) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b) (1985) (records of the closed
bank decide claimants).
51. 751 F.2d at 1138.
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Tenth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach on the issue by stat-
ing three conditions which must be met before drafts presented after
insolvency are claims reimbursable through insurance proceeds. 5 2 First,
the claims must be in existence prior to insolvency and not dependent
on obligations arising after insolvency. Second, the total liability must
be certain when the beneficiaries sue the bank's receiver. Finally, the
claims must be made in a timely manner, before assets are distributed
from the receivership estate. 5 3 Applying the Ninth Circuit test, the
court held Orion's default, at least as to the claims presented two days
after the receiver took over the bank, occurred before the insolvency
and were provable claims. 54 Since the court believed that Philadelphia
Gear, as beneficiary, was the only party permitted to make a demand on
the issuing bank for amounts under the letter of credit, logically it
should be considered the depositor in the event the issuing bank be-
came insolvent.5 5 Therefore, the court held that Philadelphia Gear was
the "depositor" for purposes of entitlement to the insurance proceeds.
The third issue the court considered was whether prejudgment in-
terest should be assessed against the FDIC in its capacity as insurer on
the $100,000 deposit insurance proceeds. The Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court on this issue by holding that prejudgment interest
should not be awarded. 56 The court noted that although the FDIC has
the capacity to sue and be sued, 5 7 it did not necessarily follow that this
waives the sovereign immunity doctrine on claims for prejudgment in-
terest. An express waiver of sovereign immunity is necessary. 58 Even
though Congress expressly recognized that delays would occur in pay-
ing some insurance claims, 59 no express waiver of its immunity to pre-
judgment interest was present. 6°
C. Conclusion
Since bank insolvency is of increasing concern, this case gives some
indication of how beneficiaries of standby letters of credit can minimize
the adverse effects such bank failures can cause their business dealings.
By structuring letters of credit to be negotiable on their face, benefi-
ciaries can better insulate their financial transactions from being unin-
sured, contingent obligations.
52. First Empire Bank-New York v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 572 F.2d 1361, 1367-
69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978).




57. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1982).
58. 751 F.2d at 1138.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (1982).
60. 751 F.2d at 1139.
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III. STATUTORY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF CREDITOR STATUS:
EUSTACE . COOPER AGENCY, INC.
A. The Facts
In Eustace v. Cooper Agency, Inc.,6 1 the plaintiff, Sadie Eustace, en-
tered into an installment credit contract with Bogue Brothers, an appli-
ance dealership, for the purchase of a washer and dryer. This contract
was assigned to the Cooper Agency, a financing entity which purchased
acceptable security agreements and sales contracts from Bogue Broth-
ers.6 2 Eustace brought this action against Bogue Brothers and the
Cooper Agency under the Truth in Lending Act63 (TILA) and Federal
Reserve Board Regulation Z.6 4 She alleged that the defendants failed to
comply with statutory and regulatory requirements by not disclosing the
creditor status of Cooper Agency in the credit contract.
6 5
The district court initially held that Eustace failed to establish that
Cooper Agency was a "creditor" as defined by the TILA. Consequently,
the installment contract's failure to identify Cooper Agency's creditor
status was immaterial and did not constitute a violation of the TILA.
66
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that the Cooper Agency was a "creditor" under the TILA6 7 and Regula-
tion Z68 since credit had been extended. Several features of the Cooper
61. 741 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 297-98.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667(e) (1982).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1985).
65. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 294-95. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed:
(1) to identify both creditors in the transaction; (2) to make the disclosures using the pre-
scribed terminology; (3) to make all required disclosures clearly, conspicuously and in
meaningful sequence; and (4) to make all required disclosures on one side of the page.
Also, the complaint alleged that improper additional information was disclosed. In short,
the alleged violations appear to be technical ones.
66. Id. In this case, the court applied the law relevant at the time the transaction
arose. The definition of "creditor" and the notification requirements have since been
modified. The court stated, however, that the same result would occur if the most current
law was applied. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 300 n. I. See also S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 71, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CONG. AD. NEws 3054, 3125 (amended section 1602(f)
excludes "arrangers of credit" except for those who regularly extend commercial credit.);
Griffith, Recent Developments in the Effort to Simplify Truth in Lending, 19 TULSA L.J. 30, 56-58,
62-67 (1983) (comparing new and old versions of the Act). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)
(1976) (creditor is person who regularly extends consumer credit which is payable in more
than four installments) with 15 U.S.C. § 1602(0 (1982) (creditor is person who regularly
extends consumer credit which is payable in more than four installments and is the person
to whom the debt is initially payable on the face of the instrument). Compare 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.1-1002 (1970) with 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1985).
67. The Act, as cited in Eustace, provided in pertinent part:
The term "creditor" refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for
the extension of, credit which is payable by agreement in more than four install-
ments or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required,
whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982)).
68. Regulation Z, as cited in Eustace, provided in pertinent part:
(5) "Creditor" means a person who in the ordinary course of business regularly
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Agency's relationship with Bogue Brothers caused the court to charac-
terize it as an entity extending credit. First, a dealer financing agree-
ment existed under which Cooper Agency agreed to purchase
acceptable sales contracts and security agreements from Bogue Broth-
ers. Second, Bogue Brothers agreed to prepare such contracts on forms
furnished by and satisfactory to the Cooper Agency. Third, Bogue
Brothers assigned all of its installment contracts to financing entities,
sixty-five percent of which were assigned to Cooper Agency. 69 Finally,
there were no more than two or three contracts which Bogue Brothers
requested Cooper Agency to return and which Cooper Agency did not
purchase. 70 Therefore, in light of all these facts, the court found
Cooper Agency to be a "creditor" for purposes of TILA disclosure re-
quirements. The court's finding of an actual extension of credit was bol-
stered by the fact that Cooper Agency gave no prior approval to the
buyer's credit application since it had recourse against Bogue
Brothers.
7 1
Addressing the second issue, which was contingent on finding that
Cooper Agency was a creditor, the court held that the failure to so iden-
tify the Cooper Agency in the installment credit contract was not a mere
technical violation of the Act, but instead warranted relief to the debtor
as provided for under the Act. The TILA requires that each creditor
must be clearly identified 72 and that the failure to do so imposes liability
under the Act.
7 3
The court found that the contract failed to identify Cooper Agency
as a creditor based on two circumstances. First, although Eustace's copy
of the contract stated that "[t]he foregoing security is hereby assigned
extends or arranges for the extension of consumer credit or offers to extend or
arrange for the extension of such credit, which is payable by agreement in more
than four installments, or for which the payment of a finance charge is or may be
required, whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or
otherwise.
12 C.F.R § 226.2 (1980) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 226.2 (1985)).
69. 741 F.2d at 298. Additionally, Bogue Brothers had been doing business with the
Cooper Agency for 10 years and was its largest source of business. Id. at 298.
70. Id.
71. The court noted the difference between this transaction and similar cases decided
in other circuits. See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 156-60 (1981)
(per curiam). In Cenance, the dealer first submitted the buyer's credit application to the
Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) for approval. It was only after the dealer was noti-
fied that the buyer passed FMCC's credit check, that the dealer and buyer executed a retail
installment contract. FMCC then repurchased the installment contract without recourse
against the dealer. Cenance, 452 U.S. at 155-57. There was no need for Cooper Agency, on
the other hand, to give prior approval to the buyer's credit application since Cooper
Agency purchased contracts with recourse against Bogue Brothers. The prior ap-
proval/recourse distinction was deemed to be of secondary significance by the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Cf. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 298; Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, 673 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.
1981). And in Joseph v. Norman's Health Club Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 90 (8th Cir. 1976), the
court stated:
In interpreting the Act, the Federal Reserve Board and the majority of courts
have focused on the substance, rather than the form, of credit transactions, and
have looked to the practices of the trade, the course of dealing of the parties, and
the intention of the parties in addition to specific contractual obligations.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1985).
73. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (1985).
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under the terms of the Seller's Recourse, recommendation, Assignment
and Guaranty on the reverse side hereof unless otherwise indicated,"
74
her copy did not contain, on the reverse side, such quoted language or a
statement that the contract was assigned to the Cooper Agency. Sec-
ond, although the contract copy did contain a reference to the Group
Creditor Life Policy pursuant to the agency agreement of Cooper
Agency, this statement was found not to be sufficiently clear to identify
Cooper Agency as a creditor. 75 Despite the fact that Eustace acknowl-
edged that she was making payments directly to the Cooper Agency, the
Tenth Circuit held that even a showing of actual knowledge does not
excuse a creditor's failure to comply with the mandatory disclosure re-
quirements, or prevent recovery under the mandatory remedial provi-
sions of the Act and the regulations.
7 6
The court concluded that since the contract did not clearly notify
Eustace of the assignment to the Cooper Agency or its status as a credi-
tor, the mandatory disclosure requirements of TILA were not met.
7 7
C. Conclusion
According to Eustace, a loose interpretation of "creditor" will be ap-
plied to those who regularly extend credit. Not only will a financing
entity be regarded as a "creditor" when it gives prior approval to credit
transactions without recourse, the entity will also be regarded as a
"creditor" when it gives no prior approval but has recourse. Addition-
ally, the argument that a financing entity such as the Cooper Agency has
in effect accepted afait accompli by merely accepting an assignment of a
completed agreement without prior approval will not be accorded much
deference. Once a financial entity falls within the definition of a credi-
tor, fastidious compliance with the consumer credit rules is mandated.
This holding should not be affected by applying current consumer credit
law. Eustace highlights that what appears to be a mere oversight will not
necessarily be regarded as a mere technical violation which requires no
remedy.
IV. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND THE "LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION"
TEST: AA1OCO OIL CO. V RAINBOW SNOW
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 78 the Tenth Circuit court ex-
panded and clarified the "likelihood of confusion" test to be applied in a
trademark infringement case. 79 In this case, Amoco Oil Company
74. Eustace, 741 F.2d at 300.
75. Id. (citing Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, 673 F.2d 256, 260 (9th Cir. 1981)).
76. 741 F.2d at 301.
77. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155 (1981)).
78. 748 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 557-58. The provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982) govern the trademark
infringement determination. That section imposes liability for the "use in commerce [of]
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive .... ." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1) (1982) (emphasis added)). This "likelihood of confusion" test was also deemed
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(Amoco) appealed the district court's denial of its motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting the appellee's use of the name "Rainbow
Snow" to describe his snow cone business.8 0
A. The Facts
In 1976, Amoco created the Rainbow Oil Company division (Rain-
bow Oil) to operate self-service gas stations in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Since that time, Rainbow Oil has operated exclusively under the
"Rainbo" trademark,8 1 and this mark appears on service station signs.8 2
The Rainbo stations have sold convenience foods since 1976, and in
1980 ice slush drinks were introduced at two Rainbow stations. 83
During the summer of 1982, Van Leeuwen operated a snow cone
business in the Salt Lake City area under the name of Rainbow Snow,
Inc.8 4 The snow cones were sold from booths displaying the name
"Rainbow Snow" beneath a rainbow logo.85 Some of these booths were
in close proximity to Rainbo stations.
86
In December of 1982, Amoco filed suit against Van Leeuwen, seek-
ing injunctive relief and alleging that use of the "Rainbow Snow" mark
constituted trademark infringement. 8 7 In its decision, the Utah federal
district court initially noted the general rule regarding likelihood of con-
fusion; would an ordinary consumer likely be confused as to the source
of the product. 88 It then applied the factors enumerated in the Restate-
ment of Torts89 to determine if there was a likelihood of confusion. Its
conjunctive application of these two legal standards led the district court
to focus solely on the issue of confusion as to source. Implicit in its
decision was the conclusion that confusion was unlikely because pro-
applicable to Amoco's pendent state claims of infringement under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70-
3-13 (1953); its claim of false designation of origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); and its
common law claims of unfair competition and deceptive trade practices, Amstar Corp. v.
Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Amoco, 748 F.2d at 557.
81. Amoco registered its "Rainbo" service mark and trademark with the United States
Patent Office in 1978 and with the State of Utah in 1982. id.
82. The word "Rainbo" appears in white letters against a black background and below
a red-orange-yellow-blue truncated rainbow logo. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. During the summer of 1981, Van Leeuwen sold snow cones from two stands in
the Salt Lake City area under the name "Sno Shop," and in October 1981, he reserved the
name "Rainbow Snow" with the State of Utah as the name for his expanded snow cone
business.
85. The Rainbow Snow booths are blue with a 180-degree, red-orange-yellow-green
rainbow appearing on the upper half of the booth, and the name "Rainbow Snow" appears
in white below the rainbow. Id. See supra note 82.
86. Id. at 557. Some Rainbow Snow booths were located adjacent to Rainbo stations,
while others were within a few blocks.
87. See supra note 79.
88. The district court stated the rule as follows: "[i]t is the generally accepted rule that
a designation is confusingly similar to a trade-mark if an ordinary prospective purchaser,
exercising due care in the circumstances, is likely to regard it as coming from the same
source as the trade-marked article." Amoco, 748 F.2d at 558 (quoting Avrick v. Rockmont
Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1946) (emphasis added)).
89. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938). The RESTATEMENT factors are:
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spective purchasers would not believe that Rainbow Snow cones
originated with the Rainbow Oil Company. 90 The district court deter-
mined that Amoco had established none of the four prerequisites to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction,9 1 and thus denied the motion.
Amoco appealed this adverse decision to the Tenth Circuit.
92
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In short, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred when it
"limited its inquiry to the issue of confusion of source, and did not con-
sider potential confusion which might result from a belief in common
sponsorship or affiliation.' '9 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the factors
enumerated in the Restatement should be applied, 94 but stated that the
district court considered those factors in too narrow a context.
9 5
The Tenth Circuit considered only whether Amoco had shown a
substantial "likelihood of success on the merits," 9 6 and premised
Amoco's ability to establish this prerequisite on its demonstrating a sub-
stantial likelihood that it would prevail on the issue of likelihood of con-
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-mark or trade
name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or services
marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers.
90. 748 F.2d at 559.
91. To obtain a preliminary injunction the moving party has the burden of
establishing:
"(1) substantial likelihood that the movant will eventually prevail on the merits;
(2) a showing that the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction
issues; (3) proof that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may be cause the opposing party; and (4) a
showing that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public
interest."
Id. at 557 (quoting Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980)).
92. Amoco appealed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
93. 748 F.2d at 559 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 558. For Tenth Circuit cases where the court has applied the RESTATEMENT
criteria, see Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983);
Drexel Enterprises v. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1962). Other courts have
also used some formulation of this same test. See, e.g., Soweco Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617
F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); McGregor-Doniger Inc.
v. Drizzle Inc., 559 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 559 F.2d
341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-
82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp.
1231, 1242 (D. Kan. 1977).
95. Amoco, 748 F.2d at 558-59. "[Tlhe Restatement factors should be considered not
only in the context of confusion of source, but also in the context of confusion that results
from a mistaken belief in common sponsorship or affiliation." Id. at 558. Implicit in this
holding is that the district court failed to consider whether prospective purchasers would
believe Rainbo and Rainbow Snow were somehow related to or affiliated with each other.
96. The court's sole concern with the first prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was premised on its belief that the district court's determination that confusion
was unlikely may have affected its resolution of the other three prerequisites. Amoco, 748
F.2d at 556, 559.
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fusion.9 7 In determining that the district court had placed too
restrictive an interpretation on the confusion requirement, the Tenth
Circuit remanded the case with instructions that the district court assess
the likelihood of confusion which might result from a belief in common
sponsorship or affiliation, and concomitantly consider the Restatement
factors.
98
The Rainbow Snow case cannot be read solely as a decision which
aligned the Tenth Circuit with other circuit courts in giving the "likeli-
hood of confusion" test a wider scope than simply an inquiry into confu-
sion of source.9 9 The question of confusion, whether of a sensory or
conceptual nature,' 0 0 or of source or affiliation, is determinative of an
infringement claim, and the Tenth Circuit's decision indicates that the
test involved in trademark infringement law is becoming both increas-
ingly expansive and subjective.' 0 1
V. BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS
A. The Effect of Primary Use of Collateral on Exemption and Lien Avoidance
Status: In re Reid
In In re Reid, 10 2 the Tenth Circuit considered whether certain paint-
ings owned by the debtors were exempt from attachment under the per-
sonal property exemption categories described in the Oklahoma
exemption statute' 0 3 and the Federal Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance
statute.' 0 4 Both statutes require that items which fall within the exemp-
tion categories must be "held primarily for the personal, family or
97. Id. at 558.
98. Id. at 559.
99. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204-05 (2d Cir. 1979); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
274 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Control Components, Inc. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770
(5th Cir. 1980).
100. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983)
(similarity of sight, sound, and meaning must each be considered).
101. For an informative case discussing the general area of trademark infringement
law, see Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
981 (1981) see also Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983)
("Beer Nuts" and "Brew Nuts"); Beatrice Foods Co. v. Neosho Valley Coop. Creamery
Ass'n, 297 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1961) ("Meadow Sweet" and "Meadow Gold"); Nebraska
Consol. Mills Co. v. Shawnee Milling Co., 198 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952) ("Mother's Best"
and "Mother's Pride").
102. 757 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1985).
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31 § i(A)(3), (7) (Supp. 1980). The pertinent portion of the
Oklahoma exemption statute provides:
[Tihe following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state,
exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for
the payment of debts, except as herein provided:
(3) All household and kitchen furniture held primarily for the personal, family
or household use of such person or a dependent of such person;
(7) All books, portraits and pictures, and wearing apparel, that are held primar-
ily for the personal, family or household use of such person or a dependent of
such person.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982). Section 522(f) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a
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household use" of the debtor. 0 5
In In re Reid, the debtors, Wayne and Dorothy Reid, operated a fam-
ily business which received fifteen religious paintings from a customer as
payment for services rendered. 10 6 The Reids hung all fifteen paintings
throughout their house. They then pledged these paintings to two
banks as collateral for loans, the proceeds of which were used for busi-
ness purposes. Both security agreements indicated, however, that the
paintings were held primarily for personal, family and household use. 
10 7
The Reids filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition approximately one year
after the loans were made, and sought to exempt the paintings from
attachment for payment of debts under the Oklahoma exemption stat-
ute. '0 8 One of the banks commenced this action in the bankruptcy court
claiming that the paintings were not exempt under the Oklahoma statute
and that the debtors could not avoid security interest liens on the prop-
erty under the Federal Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance statute. 10 9
The bankruptcy court found that the paintings were not exempt and
the liens were not avoidable, because, under all the circumstances, the
paintings were not held primarily for personal, family or household
use.10 Although the paintings were located in the debtors' home, the
bankruptcy court found that their "most important use. . .[was] pledg-
ing them commercially for commercial loans."" 1 The bankruptcy court
asserted three reasons for its conclusion. First, the paintings were re-
ceived by the Reids as a business entity and as payment on a series of
commercial transactions. Second, the paintings were pledged as collat-
eral for business loans shortly after the Reids received them and placed
them in their home. Finally, the Reids themselves indicated in their list
of assets that the paintings were a "unique collection" by not incorpo-
rating them into their general description of furniture, fixtures and ac-
lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled . . .if such lien is -
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any -
(A) household furnishings, household goods . . . that are held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
105. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(3), (7) (Supp. 1980); 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2)(A) (1982).
The debtor is allowed to choose between use of state or federal exemption provisions. In
re Reid, 757 F.2d at 231 n. 1; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982).
106. In re Reid, 757 F.2d at 231-32. The paintings were 200 to 300-year-old "classic
religious paintings" valued at approximately $187,000. A credit of $125,000 was given to
the customer's company accounts when the paintings were received. Id. at 232, 235.
107. Id. The Reids stressed the wording in the security agreements as strong evidence
that the banks recognized the personal, family and household use of the paintings. Id. at
232. The Tenth Circuit never addressed the issue of whether the banks were required to
adopt the characterization of the goods given in the security agreements furnished by
them.
108. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(3), (7) (Supp. 1980). See supra note 103. Objections
were filed by the trustee in bankruptcy and the two banks involved. Reid, 757 F.2d at 231.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 232. In the proceedings, the bankruptcy court assumed that the paintings
fell within the personal property exemption categories described in the Oklahoma exemp-
tion statute and found that the creditors' security interests were nonpossessory, nonpur-




cessories. 1 12 The district court affirmed the judgment. 113
On appeal, the issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the
bankruptcy court erred in finding that the paintings were not held pri-
marily for personal, family or household use. The court stated that it
was bound to accept the findings of the bankruptcy judge unless they
were clearly erroneous.' 4 The Tenth Circuit found that sufficient evi-
dence was introduced in the bankruptcy hearing to support the bank-
ruptcy court's findings that the paintings were received by the debtors as
a business entity and not as individuals.l 1 5 Next, the court held that the
bankruptcy court, in finding that the most important use of the paintings
was pledging them commercially for commercial loans,' 16 was not re-
quired to adopt the characterization of the items given in the security
agreement. 'i1 Finally, the court held that despite the location of the
items in the debtor's home, the bankruptcy court could properly find
that the paintings were primarily used for business rather than for
household purposes, which was deemed to be a secondary use.' '8 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit agreed with and affirmed the lower court's decision
that the paintings were not held primarily for personal, family or house-
hold use and did not fall within the exemption and lien avoidance
112. Id. at 232, 235 n.6.
113. Id. at 232.
114. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the clearly erroneous standard of review is ap-
propriate in a "core bankruptcy proceeding" under both the 1978 Bankruptcy Act and the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Id. at 234 n.5. The court
stated that the bankruptcy case before them was a " 'core proceeding' because it involved
the determination of 'exemptions from the property of estate,' defined as a 'core proceed-
ing' under § 157(b)(2)(B) of the 1984 Act." Id. at 234 n.5; cf. 1616 Reminc, Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Atchison & Keller Co., 704 F.2d 1313, 1318 (4th Cir. 1983) (use of clearly
erroneous standard unconstitutional in non-core contexts).
115. 757 F.2d at 234. To support this finding, the court noted the following:
(1) although the Reid's was a family-run business, some of the company employees were
not members of the Reid family; (2) the Reids received the paintings as payment of debts
owed the business; (3) "credit" was given to the customer's company accounts in the
amount of $125,000 for the paintings; and (4) that the Reids were seeking to discharge in
bankruptcy some of the costs incurred "in producing this $125,000 worth of work." Id. at
235.
116. Id. The Tenth Circuit also found that sufficient evidence supported the bank-
ruptcy court's finding that the paintings' most important use was pledging them commer-
cially for commercial loans, in that the paintings were pledged as collateral within a period
of six days from the first installment and a period of a few months from the second install-
ment. Additionally, Wayne Reid testified on numerous occasions that the loan proceeds
were used exclusively for business purposes. Id. at 234-35.
117. Id. at 235. See In re Currie, 34 B.R. 745, 747-48 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) (evidence
of actual use of collateral controlled over security agreement classification of collateral as
consumer goods held for family, personal or household purposes); In re Noggle, 30 B.R.
303, 305, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) ("classification of property in a security agreement is
not dispositive of questions dealing with whether the property may be claimed as exempt
or whether a lien on such property may be avoided.").
118. Reid, 757 F.2d at 235 (quoting 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUrrCY 522/12 (15th ed.
1985) ("Presumably, those goods which are primarily for occupational use ... do not fall
within the [personal, family or household use] exemption, even though there may also be a
secondary personal use.")); see also Security Building & Loan Ass'n v. Ward, 174 Okla. 238,
50 P.2d 651,656 (1935) (even though goods may have characteristics of "household furni-
ture," courts have held with practical unanimity that furniture devoted to commercial pur-
poses does not fall within the exemption statute).
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statutes.' 19
The test applied by the Tenth Circuit in denying exempt status to
these items was that use controls over nature, characterization and loca-
tion of the collateral. Thus, even though an item might fall within the
applicable exemption categories of the statutes by virtue of its nature as
personal property, it will not automatically be exempt by virtue of its
classification as "household furniture even if the item is located in the
home."' 120 Neither will an item be automatically exempt by its charac-
terization adopted by the parties to a security agreement. Although the
paintings were "used" in the Reid's home as ornamentation, their inci-
dental placement was not afforded much deference by the court. The
"actual use" itself should be carefully scrutinized. The items must be
held "primarily" for household or personal use. In looking at the "pri-
mary use" of the collateral, the court will consider such factors as the
source of the collateral as well as its future use.
B. Reopening of Bankruptcy Estate SUA SPONTE: IN RE MULLENDORE
In In re Mullendore,12 1 the court addressed the issue of whether it is
an abuse of discretion for a bankruptcy judge to reopen an estate sua
sponte for the purpose of ordering the debtor estate to pay fees to the
referees' salary and expense fund.' 22 In the original action, the district
judge who handled the Mullendore bankruptcy proceeding did not as-
sess a fee payable to this fund. The bankruptcy judge who replaced the
then-deceased district judge closed the estate on July 17, 1979. After
discovering that no charges were made or paid to the credit of the refer-
ees' fund, the bankruptcy judge reopened the estate on his own motion
on November 7, 1979. The judge then ordered the debtor estate or the
debtors to pay the amount of $14,256.06 to the clerk of the bankruptcy
court for deposit into the referees' fund.' 23 The Mullendores appealed
the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
beginning with the initial premise that a bankruptcy court is vested with
the authority to exercise original jurisdiction to reopen estates if cause is
shown. 124 The court then noted that although the duty to reopen an
estate is a discretionary one in many instances, it in effect becomes an
119. Reid, 757 F.2d at 236.
120. Id.
121. 741 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1984).
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 68(c)(2) (1982) which states: "Additional fees for the referees sal-
ary and expense fund shall be charged, in accordance with the schedule fixed by the con-
ference . . . of this Title."
123. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308 n.2.
124. Id. at 308. See 11 U.S.C. § I l(a)(8) (1982). The appellants cited In re Barlean, 290
F. Supp. 260 (D. Mont. 1968), for the proposition that "cause shown" refers to causes
which, if known to the adjudicating authority, would have altered the decision or order.
See Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308 n. 1. They argued that if the fee assessment matter had
been reconsidered by the original district judge, the results would not have been different,
and thus disputed the bankruptcy judge's decision to reopen the estate. The Tenth Circuit
briefly distinguished the Mullendores' cited authority on the ground that the court in
Barlean reached the correct result and, therefore, the motion to reopen was denied. The
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affirmative duty of the court "whenever prima facie proof exists that the
estate has not been fully administered." 125 In this case, the court found
that the estate was reopened within a reasonable time to properly com-
plete the administration of the estate. The Tenth Circuit thus held that
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the estate
sua sponte for the purpose of ordering the debtor estate to pay fees for
the referees' fund.
In reaching this conclusion, however, the court cursorily bypassed
the sua sponte initiation of the reopening. 126 Relying on rather scanty
authority, the court noted in response to the Mullendores' contention
that the bankruptcy judge had no authority to reopen the estate that" 'it
has been suggested that perhaps the court could make a reopening or-
der sua sponte.' ",127 The Tenth Circuit court bolstered its position by
citing a Second Circuit opinion, In re International Match Corp. 12 8 That
opinion held that where the referee in bankruptcy had fraudulently
taken excess commissions in violation of a court order, it was proper for
the court, upon the recommendation of a special master, to reopen the
estate and to order the recovery of the sums involved. 12 9 The Tenth
Circuit, however, failed to mark the distinction between reopening an
estate on the recommendation of a master and reopening an estate by a
bankruptcy judge sua sponte. The sua sponte reopening of an estate has
thus materialized in the Tenth Circuit in those situations in which
proper administration of an estate must be completed.
Next, the Mullendores contended that the bankruptcy judge erred
in presuming that the earlier failure of the district judge to assess the fee
was merely an oversight. The Tenth Circuit held that regardless of the
reasons for the earlier failure of the district judge to assess these fees,
fees for the fund are chargeable against each case in an arrangement
confirmed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.13 0 This statement
withstood the Mullendores' further contention that no services were
court concluded that in the appellant's situation the correct result was not reached by the
adjudicating authority at the time he acted. Id. at 308.
125. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308 (citing In rejoslyn's Estate, 171 F.2d 159, 164 (7th Cir.
1948)).
126. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 308. After stating that an "interested party" could reopen
an estate, the court failed to determine whether the bankruptcy judge was such an inter-
ested party. Apparently, a bankruptcy judge would fall within the classification of an "in-
terested party" when the referees' fund is the object to be benefited.
127. Id. at 308 (quoting I COLLIER ON BAN'~uTrcY 2.50 (14th ed. 1976)).
128. 190 F.2d 458 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 870 (1951).
129. Id. at 460-61.
130. Mullendore, 741 F.2d at 309 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 68(c)(2) (1976), which states that
"fees ... shall be charged . . . against each [chapter 11] case . ." (see supra note 122); 11
U.S.C. § 65 (1976), providing that the judicial Conference of the United States is to deter-
mine "schedules of graduated additional fees to be charged ... ;" and THE 1948 REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATEs 31, stating that "[aidditional charges
for the referees' salary and expense funds . . .shall be collected . . . in all straight bank-
ruptcy cases .. ."). The additional charges for the referees' salary and expense fund in
those Chapter 11 cases administered before a district court without a reference to a refe-
ree in bankruptcy appear to have been based on policy considerations of uniform costs of
administration and for provision of funds necessary to maintain the referees' salary and
expense fund.
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performed by a referee sufficient to justify an assessment for the fund.
The Tenth Circuit held that even in Chapter 11 cases administered with-
out reference to referees, such fees are chargeable to the estate.' 3 ' The
court then stated that these fees must be paid in full unless they have
been waived. Since there had been no waiver, and no deposit covering
these fees had been made, the court found that the Chapter 11 arrange-
ment had been erroneously confirmed.
13 2
Finally the Mullendores contended that the discharge in bankruptcy
released the former debtors in possession from any provable debt owed
to the United States.' 33 The court first stated than an unsecured debt
includes within its confines unsecured priority debts, and that the fees
for the referees' fund are such priority debts. 13 4 The Tenth Circuit
found, however, that the requirement that such a debt must be provided
for by the arrangement in order to be discharged by the confirmation of
the arrangement had not been satisfied. " 'If a plan does not provide for
the payment of some consideration for the modification or alteration of
a creditor's rights, the debt owed to that creditor is not affected by the
discharge which results from confirmation of the plan.' ,1'35 Since the
district judge did not assess a fee payable to the referees' salary and
expense fund, and the arrangement did not provide for the payment of
such fees, the fees were not discharged by the confirmation of the
arrangement.
The complete administration of an estate is the primary goal when
an estate is reopened. In re Mullendore thus illustrates that the non-pay-
ment of fees for the referees' fund falls under the aegis of "cause
shown" to enable a bankruptcy court to exercise its jurisdiction to reo-
pen an estate.
C. Bankruptcy Automatic Stay Protection: Fortier v.
Dona Anna Plaza Partners
In Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners,13 6 the Tenth Circuit held that
11 U.S.C. § 36213 7 stays litigation only against the debtor and affords no
protection to solvent co-defendants of that debtor. In this case, shop-
ping center buyers (the Fortiers) sued the developer-seller (Peterson)
for damages in connection with the development, construction and sale
of the Dona Anna Plaza Shopping Center. 138 In a suit brought in the
131. The appellants relied on 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) which states: "The confirmation
of an arrangement shall discharge a debtor from all his unsecured debts and liabilities
provided for by the arrangement, except as provided in the arrangement or the order
confirming the arrangement, but excluding such debts as, under section 35 of this title, are
not dischargeable."
132. Mulendore, 741 F.2d at 309-10.
133. 741 F.2d at 310.
134. Id. (citing 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.32 (14th ed. 1976) and 11 U.S.C.
§ 104(a) (1976)).
135. 741 F.2d at 310 (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.32 (14th ed. 1976)).
136. 747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
138. 747 F.2d at 1328.
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United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, the Fortiers
alleged that Peterson was negligent in instructing his architect, Arm-
strong, to ignore certain parking lot design recommendations concern-
ing soil conditions. Armstrong complicated the trial proceedings by
filing for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of California five days before the trial was to begin.
All pending proceedings against Armstrong were automatically stayed
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362.139 The damage action was immediately
removed by the Fortiers to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Mexico. 140 The next day, the Fortiers filed a complaint
seeking relief from the automatic stay that became effective in the New
Mexico bankruptcy court. The New Mexico bankruptcy judge lifted the
stay and allowed the case to proceed. Thus, the case was transferred
back to the New Mexico district court. The district court rendered judg-
ment in favor of the Fortiers against Peterson and Armstrong. 14 1
On appeal, Peterson contended that Armstrong's bankruptcy filing
stayed the litigation against all parties and thus divested the district
court of jurisdiction to hear the case. 14 2 The Tenth Circuit dismissed
Peterson's contention, stating that the language of 11 U.S.C § 362 stays
only proceedings "against the debtor," and that no language in the stat-
ute purports to extend the stay to causes of action against solvent co-
defendants of the debtor.14
3
The court reasoned that it would be contrary to the legislative pur-
poses underlying an automatic stay to extend stay protections to solvent
co-defendants of the debtor.144 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit refused to
extend Armstrong's automatic stay to Peterson and joined other circuit
courts in concluding that 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays litigation only against
139. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all enti-
ties, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial . . . proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title
140. Id. The Fortiers' action was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1478 (1§82) and local
Bankruptcy Rule 1- 118.
141. 747 F.2d at 1328-29.
142. Id. at 1329. Peterson also argued that the New Mexico bankruptcy court had no
jurisdiction to lift the stay since an automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 must be
obtained from the court in which the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, in this case the
California bankruptcy court. This argument was never addressed by the Tenth Circuit
since the court found that an automatic stay applied "only to the debtor." Id. at 1329.
Peterson raised four other arguments as well, but they are outside the scope of this article.
Id. at 1325.
143. Id. at 1330. See supra note 139.
144. Since the legislative purpose for an automatic stay is to permit the debtor to reor-
ganize his affairs without creditor harassment and to allow organized claim resolution, the
court stated that it is not logical to extend the stay to solvent co-defendants. Id. at 1330.
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the debtor. 145
Riisa Steinhardt
145. Id. (citing Williford v. Armstrong World Indus.. Inc.. 715 F.2d 124, 126-27 (4th
Cir. 1983); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983); Austin v.
Unarco Indus.. Inc. 705 F.2d I, 4-5 (Ist Cir.) cert. dismissed. 463 U.S. 1247 (1983); Pitts v.
Unarco Indus.. Inc. 698 F.2d 313 (7th (:ir-. 1983); Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983)). See also /i re Convention Masters. Inc.. 46 B.R. 339, 341
(Bankr. D. Md. 1985).
[Vol. 63:2
